
Originally Posted by
CFH
It was a calculated program of sustained military expansion that the U.S government knew the U.S.S.R. had no choice but to attempt to keep up with, while knowing that the economic situation of the U.S.S.R. would not allow for it.
The Russian's desire for "western freedoms", while no doubt playing a minor role, could not have toppled the Soviet Union. There was absolutely no history of democracy in Russia, and many would argue that there isn't democracy in Russia now.
When Reagan started to build up military spending the USSR carried on its merry way. By the time Gorbachov came to power the US was running huge deficits partly as a result of military spending and was actually in a worse position than it had been in 1980. Gorbachov could easily have kept on with the cold war but was the head of a new breed of Soviet leaders who wanted to spend their economic resources contructively. What really got the Soviets to change their mind was the Saudis flooding the world market with oil, bankrupting the Soviets. Capitalism won the cold war, not Reagan. Here's the very capitalist AEI to explain it :
The timeline of the collapse of the Soviet Union can be traced to September 13, 1985. On this date, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the minister of oil of Saudi Arabia, declared that the monarchy had decided to alter its oil policy radically. The Saudis stopped protecting oil prices, and Saudi Arabia quickly regained its share in the world market. During the next six months, oil production in Saudi Arabia increased fourfold, while oil prices collapsed by approximately the same amount in real terms.
As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per year, money without which the country simply could not survive.
[The Soviet leadership was then faced with three options: start charging hard currency for oil exports, reduce food imports, or cut back military spending. None of them were seriously considered.]
Unable to realize any of the above solutions, the Soviet leadership...started to borrow money from abroad while its international credit rating was still strong. It borrowed heavily from 1985 to 1988, but in 1989 the Soviet economy stalled completely....The Soviet Union then received a final warning from the Deutsche Bank and from its international partners that the funds would never come from commercial sources. Instead, if the Soviet Union urgently needed the money, it would have to start negotiations directly with Western governments about so-called politically motivated credits.
....When the situation in the Soviet Union is examined from financial and hard currency perspectives, Gorbachev's policies at the time are much easier to comprehend (see figure 6). Government-to-government loans were bound to come with a number of rigid conditions. For instance, if the Soviet military crushed Solidarity Party demonstrations in Warsaw, the Soviet Union would not have received the desperately needed $100 billion from the West.
The only option left for the Soviet elites was to begin immediate negotiations about the conditions of surrender. Gorbachev did not have to inform President George H. W. Bush at the Malta Summit in 1989 that the threat of force to support the communist regimes in Eastern Europe would not be employed. This was already evident at the time. Six weeks after the talks, no communist regime in Eastern Europe remained.
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