
Originally Posted by
LobowolfXXX
I don't want to infer too much, as I am sort of commenting on my understanding of InTheNeutralCorner's comments, which may me inaccurate.
In general, legal proceedings, particularly ones with constitutional implications (e.g. "due process") involve balancing tests between the interests of the individual, and the interests of society. The danger of blanketly placing the sole discretion in the hands of the victim (or the victim's family) is that the rights of the individual, or the rights of society, may be insufficiently protected.
For instance, if the Collinses were "overly" forgiving, then could have insisted that he be reinstated immediately, and that decision might insufficiently protect other boxers from a potentially dangerous individual. Or it might not be enough of a deterrent for others who might commit the same act.
Conversely, if they were "overly" vindictive, then there would be the potential for punishment that is disproportionate to an infraction. The legal parallel to this would be "cruel and unusual punishment" in the United States (one consideration of which is proportionality).
Getting back to this particular case, what I took ITNC to mean, and the degree to which I agree with him, is this. In this case, I think that the actual duration of the suspension to date, and Resto's apparent remorse, is enough that I think that a decision of leniency would not, in this case, by overly lenient. I think that Resto's punishment has been sufficient to serve as a deterrent. I also don't think that other boxers would be put in danger by Resto's reinstatement (however, that is not the only criterion at issue)
Conversely, I think that what he did was serious enough that it would not be grossly unfair if he were never reinstated. I think it would be reasonable for it to be a lifetime ban.
So, what I took ITNC to be saying (and was agreeing with) was that in this particular instance, reinstatement would not be overly lenient, and non-reinstatement would not be overly harsh. We're in a place where any potential decision would be reasonable, and so, in this particular case, the commissioners "should" defer to the Collinses. It's not, in other words, an "assumption" that they should do this, but a judgment based on the details of this precise matter. I appreciate that reasonable minds can differ on this.
With respect to the criminal sentence that Resto served, while the interests of the criminal justice system and the NYSAC are in some respects parallel (e.g. protecting the public/other boxers), they're not identical. The NYSAC has interests that are completely outside the realm of consideration of the criminal courts (such as protecting the best interests of boxing, a criterion that is specifically enumerated in the rules/laws governing the commission's licensing decisions). On the other hand, whether or not Resto is ready to be a productive member of society is a factor for the criminal justice system in deciding his criminal sentence, or whether or not to grant early parole, but is not necessarily a factor the NYSAC should consider.
So whether he's "paid a debt to society" as a matter of criminal law, while it may be related to the commission's decision, is not the be-all, end-all for the licensing decision, and given his history, they're certainly under no obligation to treat him exactly as they would treat a first-time applicant. Resto's having spent his time in prison doesn't obligate the commission to treat him as though he has a clean slate (as baseball commissioner Landis was permitted to ban players who had been acquitted by a criminal court, in the interests of baseball).
Ironically, when this discussion started, I was viewing the suggestion to take the Collins family's wishes into account as being potentially helpful to Resto; it's been a while since I've seen the documentary, but my recollection is that at least his widow had forgiven Resto, and deferring to her wishes may be favorable to Resto should the commission otherwise be inclined to maintain the suspension. But if they were opposed, I'd be inclined to defer to those wishes, too.
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